



Individual Portfolio

Security in Software Engineering

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Six tasks, One playbook

One throughline: shift-left where you can, detect at runtime where you must, and never trust by default.

SAST + DAST

build-time and run-time scanning

Pentest

automated recon before manual testing

Zero Trust


how GenAI reshapes ZTA

API Security

a working honeypot, probed live


Seminar

AI-driven threats meet course concepts



Validated on **OWASP Juice Shop** + a custom Shadow API.

01 · SAST shift-left scanning




5 stages, fast to deep:

- > IDE [SonarLint](#) live
- > commit [Semgrep](#) blocks critical
- > PR [Semgrep + SonarCloud](#)
- > nightly [Bandit](#) deep


Key idea

No single scanner wins. Match the tool to when it runs and how deep it must go.




Measured & reproduced on Juice Shop (485 files)

01 · SAST the Quality Gate passes




Every push and pull request sends results to **SonarCloud**, a live dashboard tracking security, reliability and maintainability. The project **passes its Quality Gate**.




Honest reading

Reliability and Maintainability are A. The Security E is a single hotspot, disabled CSRF, which is a documented false positive: CSRF does not apply to a Bearer-token API with no auth cookies.



02 · DAST run-time scanning with ZAP




3 execution moments:

- > smoke scan post-deploy
- > **PR gate** blocks merge
- > scheduled deep scan

Authenticated by design


OIDC login to token to authenticated context;
logout excluded to keep the session alive.

Real ZAP scan: **0 High**, 2 Medium, 1 Low.



OWASP ZAP on Juice Shop (10 Mar 2026)

03 · Pentest automated reconnaissance




recon.sh automates the repetitive PTES phases:

- > dig, nmap, curl, gobuster
- > one report folder per run

From signal to attack path

port 5000 to Docker Registry: a High-risk lead. robots.txt to /ftp: directory exposed.


Report generated & verified on Juice Shop.





Recon findings by risk

04 · API Security

the Shadow API honeypot




A deliberately vulnerable API that looks irresistible and logs every probe. Five OWASP API Top 10 flaws, probed live.




The chained attack

No login needed: one leaked secret signs every token, so a config leak collapses the whole auth model. Every request becomes a high-confidence detection event.

05 · IDN Youth Seminar critical reflection




Panel 1 thread: static, rule-based tools fail against AI-accelerated threats. The answer is not to replace them, but to add an adaptive layer.




Defence in depth: the three layers are complementary, not alternatives.

Takeaway

No single tool is enough. The course gives the vocabulary to layer static analysis, runtime detection and human awareness.



06 · Zero Trust & GenAI



Question: what new attack surfaces does GenAI add, and how does ZTA respond?



New surfaces (OWASP LLM Top 10)

- > Prompt injection (LLM01)
- > Data / model exfiltration (LLM02)
- > RAG leakage (LLM08)

ZTA response:


- > model & tools = new PEPs
- > retrieval filtered by user identity
- > I/O guardrails + least privilege



Zero Trust Access in AI & LLM Systems

Bottom line

GenAI does not invalidate Zero Trust, it validates it: assume breach was always the point. NIST SP 800-207 + OWASP LLM Top 10.




On a pull request: DAST gate + SAST checks, all green

The portfolio is active CI/CD workflows



On a push to master: SAST suite + scheduled ZAP scan

Five GitHub Actions workflows run on every push and pull request. They are not just documented, they run.



Thank You

Shift-left. Detect at runtime. Assume breach.

Six tasks, one defence-in-depth mindset.

University of Aveiro

Security in Software Engineering

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